Frustración voluntaria

Richard Carrier has made an attempt to refute the Kalam argument on his page. I proceed to publish a response to his writing.

Dr. Carrier presents his rebuttal as follows:

- The first and second premises of the Kalam cosmological argument are false, namely, that 1) Everything that begins to exist does so by virtue of something else, and 2) The universe began to exist. The first premise is false because it is not necessarily true, and the second is likewise false because it has not been established by science.

- Even if the second premise were true, the first would be false as a result, since nothingness would precede the laws of physics and would not be subject to them, nor therefore to the principle of sufficient reason.

That concludes Dr. Carrier's main remarks.

Regarding the second premise:

Given the uncertainty that the question raises, let's assume we don't know whether the universe began to exist or not and have to decide based on logic and data considered undeniable. Well, it is undeniable that, in the universe, one state follows another, otherwise, we would find ourselves in an eternal "now". This succession is either finite or infinite. If it is finite, the universe began to exist. If it is infinite, acknowledging that we have conceded that time is divided into discrete elements, called moments or states of affairs, and we find ourselves in a certain moment or state of affairs, this entails that the previous moments or states of affairs have ended. Now, if they have ended, they were not infinite, so there is no infinite causal regression.

The above can be illustrated with the following example: someone who says "I will not give you a penny unless I have given you a dime before, and I will not give you a dime unless I have given you a penny before" will never give us either a penny or a dime.

Regarding the first premise:

Let's now see if the first premise, the principle of sufficient reason, has been correctly invalidated by Dr. Carrier. In his reasoning, he proposes that we should only admit as a universal principle, applicable to all possible universes, one that is necessarily true in a logical sense. Therefore, if we were to prove that the principle of sufficient reason is necessarily true, Dr. Carrier would have no choice but to accept the premise as valid.

In this vein, it must be noted that the impossible and the necessary depend only on their own notion, so they remain always invariable, installed in non-being and being respectively. However, what is caused depends on a foreign notion that joins it, which is why it goes from non-being to being and from being to non-being, that is, it is subject to change and is neither impossible nor necessary. Thus, the classic cosmological argument can be formulated based on these premises:

- What has a cause owes its being to another being.

- The impossible cannot be. Therefore, it does not owe its being to another being nor has a cause.

- The necessary cannot not be. Therefore, it either exists by another necessary being or by itself. If it exists by another necessary being, it is less necessary than that being, since it is needed by it and is not necessitating. But this cannot be maintained, given that there are no degrees in necessity, as there are none in impossibility. Also, something cannot have its being by itself and by another. Therefore, a necessary being is by itself. Therefore, it does not owe its being to another being nor has a cause.

From the above it follows that:

1) What is neither impossible nor necessary has a cause, that is, owes its being to another being.

2) What changes is neither impossible (because it comes to be) nor necessary (because it ceases to exist).

3) Consequently, what changes has a cause, that is, owes its being to another being.

Dr. Carrier appears inconsistent in rejecting the principle of sufficient reason for considering it not necessarily true (although we have seen that it is) and instead positing principles that are not necessarily true, such as the existence of something like the simplest physical state logically possible. This assumes that there is a maximum simplicity in the physical when precisely the opposite occurs: everything physical undergoes mutation, so it necessarily has parts and is not maximally simple. The maximally simple or absolutely one is, by definition, what is outside nature, beyond space and time, that is, God.

Dr. Carrier also maintains that it is the theist's burden of proof to demonstrate that an infinite succession is logically impossible. Although we have already shown that it indeed is, Carrier remains skeptical of this kind of argumentation and objects that, to be in a certain state of affairs, we do not need to have gone through all the previous states of affairs. Ironically, this presupposes that, instead of the causal chain of events, a miraculous force has been responsible for our being in time without proceeding from it.

But let's overlook this absurdity and provide Dr. Carrier with the proof he demands. It is not ours; it is from Avicenna. He writes:

In the aggregate of an infinite series of causes and effects, either all members of the series will be effects, or some of them will not be effects.

- If all were effects, they would all have a possible existence, as they depend on a cause and not on themselves, so, since they exist by another, they necessarily presuppose an uncaused cause outside the series.

- And if not all were effects, at least one of them would be an uncaused cause, from which it follows that the series would not be infinite, contrary to what has been assumed.

Therefore, Dr. Carrier's attempt to refute the Kalam argument, although ingenious, does not achieve its aim of destroying the premises that lead to the conclusion he seeks to avoid. And since he admits that the syllogism is formally valid, with the premises remaining intact, its conclusion must also be upheld.

* * *

The necessary is that whose non-existence is logically impossible. Therefore, the necessary always exists and never begins to exist.

The impossible is that whose existence is logically impossible. Therefore, the impossible never exists and never begins to exist.

Between these two poles is the possible, which is that which is not logically included or excluded from existence. It is obvious, then, that if the merely possible comes to exist, it will not be due to its own notion (that is, by logical necessity), but by the action of another (that is, by a causal relation in which the possible is the effect).

Now, what changes is neither impossible nor necessary. For, if something changes, it has come to be from one state of affairs to the other, so it is not impossible, because it came into existence. At the same time, it ceases to exist in part, in the sense that one state of affairs gives rise to another, so it is also not necessary, because it failed to exist in part. Consequently, what changes has a cause.

The previous conclusion becomes the initial premise of a new syllogism:

1) What changes has a cause, that is, owes its being to another being.

2) The universe changes both quantitatively and qualitatively, as it increases in time and extension and changes the relations between its parts.

3) Therefore, the universe has a cause, that is, owes its being to another being.

Since the universe is the sum of everything material, temporal, and extensive, its cause can only be conceived as immaterial, timeless, and unextended. The above is proven as follows:

The universe is the aggregate of all material things and their causal relationships. If the cause of the universe is material, then the cause of the universe is part of the universe and it is its own cause, which would make it necessary. But we have seen that what changes is not necessary, and the universe changes; hence it is not necessary. It follows that the first cause of all material things cannot be material. It is unavoidable, then, that the first cause not be a material cause, but an efficient, formal, and final cause of the universe. Now, such is the first principle or God.

The universe is the aggregate of all material things and their causal relationships. If the cause of the universe is material, then the cause of the universe is part of the universe and it is its own cause, which would make it necessary. But we have seen that what changes is not necessary, and the universe changes; hence it is not necessary. It follows that the first cause of all material things cannot be material. It is unavoidable, then, that the first cause not be a material cause, but an efficient, formal, and final cause of the universe. Now, such is the first principle or God.

If the universe has a cause and it is an immaterial being, there cannot be an infinite regress in causes. On the contrary, the succession of causes must stop at said immaterial being, which cannot be caused by a material being, since every material being is part of the universe, which is an effect and not a cause, nor by another immaterial being, bearing in mind that there can be no real division and therefore causality in what completely lacks matter, extension, and movement.

* * *

For the first state of the universe to bypass P1 in the way I have presented the argument, it must be immutable, since if it were mutable, I have shown that it would be neither impossible nor necessary, which would imply that it owes its being to another, hence not being the first state of the universe. However, the hypothesis of an immutable and uncaused initial state leads to two difficulties, the first of which I already referred to in a previous message: 

1) By definition, everything that is a cause of itself is a necessary being. Thus, if a part of the universe is the cause of the universe, then the universe is a cause of itself or, in equivalent terms, is a necessary being. Nonetheless, we have already seen that what is mutable is not necessary, and the universe is mutable. Therefore, the universe is not necessary and, for the same reason, is not a cause of itself. Note that by using the term universe I am referring to the sum of all states of affairs that have existed, exist, and will exist, not to a specific configuration of reality. 

2) You cannot argue that what is part of the universe is immutable. It is so that everything material is in a proximate or distant reciprocal relationship, without gaps by which a state of affairs in the universe is completely independent of another. For this reason, if something is material, it will be mutable by the mere fact of being immersed in the same order as the rest of the matter. In other words, causality is bidirectional: the cause produces a change in the effect and, if such cause is finite, is likewise changed by the effect. You could only avoid this consequence if you completely isolated the cause from its effect, but then it would not be the cause of its effect! For this reason, God can create the universe ex nihilo through an infinite power, that is, without any effort or instrument, but we cannot say the same for a material being, which necessarily will be moved in some way when causing what you call the universe.

* * *

There are several demonstrations that conclude the logical impossibility of an infinite causal succession in act. I have proposed one, formulated by Avicenna, which you have not deemed worthy of consideration.

But there’s more. John Peckham has two demonstrations in this sense.

First argument against the eternity of the universe

All the past was future. The entirety of the past is past. Thus, at one time or another, it was future. But when all time was future, it was at the beginning of its being and duration, for it lacked a past. Therefore, time had a beginning, and the universe had a start.

To refute the argument, one would have to maintain that the first premise, All past was future, is false. But it does not seem to be. A past that has not been future before has always been in act. However, this is not the nature of time, which passes from potentiality to act, as does also movement.

Second argument against the eternity of the universe

Let’s assume a world with an infinite past, which has never begun to exist, and an infinite future, which will never cease to exist. Take a moment on any given day and call it A. We can refer to all the time preceding moment A as “Past A,” and all the time following it as “Future A.” Similarly, take another moment on a later day and call it B. Let us then refer to all the time preceding moment B as “Past B,” and all the time following it as “Future B.” If we superimpose Past A over Future A, neither will exceed the other, since both are infinite, and there is no reason to presuppose a greater number of past days than a greater number of future days. For the same reason, Past B and Future B will be equal to each other. However, Past B is greater than Past A, as the latter is a part of the former. And, since Past A and Future A are equal, it follows that Past B is also greater than Future A. Now, Past B and Future B are equal. Consequently, Future B is greater than Future A. But this is impossible, since Future B, which originates from a moment later than A, is part of Future A. As this reasoning results in the part being greater than the whole, which constitutes an absurdity, it must be concluded that the premise leading to this paradox, namely, the eternity of the world, is false.

Third argument against the eternity of the universe

There is a third demonstration, and this one is mine (A Stone in the Lake, arguments 20 and 24), or at least I am not aware that it has been formulated before:

If everything has a cause, then the whole has a cause. This cause is either not part of the whole or is part of the whole.

If the cause of the whole is not part of the whole, the whole is not the whole, which is absurd.

But if the cause of the whole is part of the whole, then the part is superior to the whole, given that the cause is always superior to the effect. This contradicts the axiom according to which the whole is always superior to the part.

Consequently, it is false that everything has a cause. Therefore, it is false that there is an infinite causal succession in act.

If someone were to doubt that the appropriate cause is always superior to the effect, they must consider that, if there is more in the effect than there is in the cause, what is extra in the effect would come from nothingness, and nothingness would be a concurrent cause of the effect, which makes no sense.

They should also contemplate that, if nothing can give being to itself, because nothing is superior to itself, but the cause gives being to its effect, it follows that the cause is always superior to the effect, since it can do what the effect can never do. On the other hand, if the effect could do as much as the cause, the effect could be its own cause, which would make cause and effect indistinguishable. That would leave us with a cause without effect or with an effect without a cause, which is impossible. Therefore, the cause is always superior to the effect.

* * *

If the universe began at a point in time, its past is finite. Conversely, if it has no endpoint, its future is boundless. Within the block universe theory, which posits that all time exists simultaneously, we face the dilemma of envisioning a boundless nature bounded by its own nature, a paradox. 

For an absolutely unbounded nature, there are no intrinsic limits. There are no extrinsic limits either, other than the principle of non-contradiction. Something that has no limits and aims for no ends has no reason to limit itself. Therefore, a self-bounding absolute nature is a mere figment.

Thus, eternalism is tenable—or perhaps conceivable—solely under the condition of an infinite past. Yet, how can one claim that the concept of an infinite past derives from eternalism, when, indeed, the reasoning unfolds in the opposite manner? 

You will necessarily have to proceed in the opposite direction and demonstrate that an infinite past can be conceived without contradiction, despite violating Ockham's principle (entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity) and being foreign to all human experience, which is always finite. 

Well, the demonstration you have outlined is astonishingly weak. You say: since we can conceive an infinity of ideas, we can also conceive an infinity of moments; therefore, an infinite past can be upheld, entailing no contradiction whatsoever. 

The difference is that ideas exist in an ideal region, without succession, and time is only time if one state of affairs follows another. Otherwise, how does your universe differ from the Being of Parmenides? For what reason should we assert that there is a multiplicity of observable events—a presupposition that underlies all natural science—if, in reality, nothing happens and everything is one? 

Now, if states of affairs succeed one another, it is true that All the past was future, because a past that has never been future is a past that has never begun to be and will never cease to be, that is, it is an entity to which nothing precedes and nothing follows. 

However, if the entire future has already occurred even though we do not perceive it, it will be false that the cause produces the effect, since all parts of the universe will necessarily be connected by metaphysical necessity rather than united by virtue of an intelligible physical law. And with this, all our knowledge of nature is destroyed and reduced to mere fiction. 

Therefore, even if the eternity of the world were not logically contradictory (although it can be demonstrated that it is), it would be an absolutely superfluous and mystical hypothesis that we could only assume at the expense of discarding all scientific knowledge.